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A two-stage bargaining model is developed to describe how fertility decisions are made
in a strategic family setting. Given the assumption that family contracts are incom-
plete and cannot be used to enforce optimal behavior, it is shown that investments in
children (i.e. the fertility rate) may be sub-optimal. This is because the woman may
nd it in her interest to invest too little in children in stage 1 of the model in order to
protect her bargaining status in stage 2. I then consider in the context of this model
the impact on fertility rates of changes in child custody rules (in the case of divorce),
the wage rate, and the male-female wage dierential. I conclude by exploring how the
introduction of child subsidies can change the results. (JEL D13, H55, J13, J14, J22)
Keywords: Family bargaining; Fertility; Child subsidies; Labor Participation Rate
This article is based on chapter 5 of my PhD dissertation.1 Introduction
The extent to which children are `social public goods' will dier from one country to
another. Children have public good characteristics in countries like Italy where the
fertility rate is signicantly below reproduction-rate and the pension system is of the
pay-as-you-go type. Children are public goods to a far lesser extent in developing
countries where fertility rates are high or in countries that do not have pay-as-you-go
pension systems. The extent to which children are public goods therefore depends not
only on the fertility rate of a country but also on the institutional setting. Large budget
decits and pay-as-you-go pension systems increase the public good value of children.
Whether or not children should be viewed as public goods from a societal perspec-
tive, they certainly exhibit some of the characteristics of public goods inside the family.
In a family partnership consisting of both a woman and a man it is typically the woman
who incurs most of the costs of having children { both physically through pregnancy
and in terms of opportunity costs on the job market { while both parents can equally
enjoy the benets from having children.
I attempt here to model individuals' fertility behavior in a family setting. I look at
two dierent ways in which a family might be organized: rst, a traditional way where
husband and wife attempt to maximize a joint family utility function and second, a
more strategic bargaining approach where individuals' still work together but attempt
to secure their bargaining position while doing so. I consider how changes in outside
options like wage-rates and divorce laws may alter fertility behavior for both of these
alternative family models.
In the Family Economics literature there are two main ways of modelling family
decisions. The rst class consists of joint family utility models in the tradition of Samuel-
son (1956) and Becker (1965, 1981). Becker's rst models on the family in the 1960's
were the beginning of a school of thought called `New Home Economics'. The starting
point was Becker's belief that economic reasoning is not limited to market transactions
but provides a useful framework for understanding all human behavior. Models in the
1tradition of new home economics treat families as `little rms' that try to maximize
`family production'. These models assume that there exists a joint family utility func-
tion that re
ects the interests of all family members. The complementarity between
the family members (husband and wife) determines the size of the `marriage gains'.
Since family gains arise from specialization, family utility is maximized when family
members allocate their investments and their working time to that sector where they
have the higher comparative advantage (the sectors being market work or household
activities). Each person maximizes personal as well as total family utility by choosing
the optimal investment level of human capital in either the household or the market
sector. Given that all family members are identical in the beginning, these models
predict equal distribution of `family gains' among the family members. Models in this
tradition (e.g. Becker, Murphy and Tamura 1990) acknowledge the impact of outside
options on the fertility rate of households and predict that the demand for children falls
when they become more expensive. But while these models make explicit the decision
process inside families with respect to having children, they do so in an environment
that has little resemblance with the `real world'. Maximizing a joint family utility func-
tion in a `rst best world' necessarily leads to a Pareto optimal outcome but { as Pollak
(1985) stresses { \the New Home Economics literature ignores the internal organiza-
tion and structure of families and households". In my view, this approach can serve as
an important benchmark, but does not capture the decision process of self-interested
individuals.
The second class consists of bargaining models, most of the time using cooperative
game theory (see for example Pollak 1985, Eswaran 2002, Murphy 2002, Stevenson 2007,
and Iyigun and Walsh 2007). Bargaining models employ game theory to model family
behavior. These models use individual utility functions and do not assume the existence
of a joint family utility function. \Spouses are assumed to have con
icting preferences
and to resolve their dierences in the manner prescribed by some explicit bargaining
model" (Pollak, 1985). These models stress the importance of outside options (threat
points) in determining the distribution of resources inside families.
2In this study I construct a bargaining model to explore how intra-family bargaining
impacts on fertility choices. The model allows me not only to analyze the intra-family
bargaining in stage 2 but also the individual family members' strategic behavior in stage
1 which determines their threat-points. In this sense my model diers from most of the
bargaining literature which typically takes the individuals' threat-points as exogenously
given (for a recent exception see Iyigun and Walsh 2007).1
My model has two stages. In the rst stage the woman has to decide on her relative
investment in having children and human capital accumulation. The man spends all
his time accumulating human capital. At the end of stage 1, the woman and man
can divorce. In stage 2, the woman and man must each decide how to allocate their
time between caring for the children and working in the labor market. Divorce aects
each spouse's utility since children are treated as intra-family public goods. They cease
to be public goods after divorce. Hence there is a marriage surplus. It is assumed
this surplus is split according to the Nash (1950) bargaining rule. I further assume
that the marriage contract the spouses enter into is incomplete. By that I mean that
it is either not possible to write a contract that species the optimal future behavior
of the spouses or one that regulates future pay-os depending on optimal behavior.
This concept of `incomplete contracts' is borrowed from the Industrial Organization
literature where it is often discussed in connection with the so-called `hold-up' problem
(see e.g. Hart 1995). I show how the woman may invest more time in human capital
accumulation in stage 1 and less in children than is optimal (in terms of maximizing
family utility) in order to improve her bargaining position in stage 2. This is because
the bargaining power of the woman in the model is determined during stage 1 when
investments in human capital are made. Investments in market-related human capital
generally increase a woman's bargaining power as she can always recoup the return on
this investment (in terms of wages) during stage 2. Stage 1 investments in children
1My model is related to those of Eswaran (2002) and Iyigun and Walsh (2007). These authors,
however, approach the problem from the perspective of developing countries undergoing demographic
transitions. My model by contrast is not couched in a development context.
3generally do not increase a woman's bargaining power as she typically will not recoup
all the returns on her investments. This situation occurs in part because of divorce
custody laws (the man may receive partial or full custody over the children in stage
2 even though the woman incurred the investment cost of children) and also because
there is no outside market for her investment in period 2 { that is other people do not
derive the same level of utility from the couple's children as they do themselves.
Having developed the model I then explore the impact of changes in child custody
rules in the case of divorce, changes in the wage rate, and changes in the male-female
wage dierential on fertility rates. I conclude by considering how the introduction of
child subsidies can change the results. In particular, I show that child subsidies can
help ameliorate the problem of an ineciently low fertility rate. This result ties in
with the nding of Cigno, Luporini and Pettini (2003) and Cigno and Werding (2007)
that unfunded public pension systems can also cause the fertility rate to be ineciently
low. These authors likewise recommend child subsidies as one way of dealing with this
problem. My ndings here therefore complement theirs.
2 The Model
A two stage model is examined. To facilitate the analysis it is assumed that couples
are already matched up before the commencement of the \game" and that husband
and wife have identical human capital at that point.2 It is assumed that the spouses
are rational individuals with stable preferences. Marriage occurs in order to maximize
utility, and there is no altruism. The utility functions are increasing in income and
children. Children enter into the utility function through some combination of quantity
and quality, where quality, in turn, is an increasing function of the time parents spend
at home with the children.
I consider two periods: the investment period (stage 1) and period 2 which rep-
resents `the rest of time' (stage 2). All future consumption is collapsed into period
2Assortive mating (see for example Becker 1981) is therefore not considered here.
42.
Stage 1:
Stage 1 is the investment period. A woman has one unit of time which can be allocated
either to the accumulation of human capital or to having children. Let tF
1 denote the
amount of time allocated to human capital accumulation. It follows that 1   tF
1 is
allocated to having children. The total amount of human capital accumulated is given
by the function H(tF
1 ), where H is increasing in tF
1 . The number of children a woman
has is determined by the function G(tF
1 ), where G(1) = 0, G0(tF
1 ) < 0 and G00(tF
1 ) < 0.
It follows, therefore, that the opportunity cost of having children is the human
capital that the woman could have accumulated during this time in the market. The
woman's decision problem in period 1 is therefore to choose the optimal level of tF
1 .
A man can also engage in human capital accumulation, with the same return per
unit of time as a woman. The essential asymmetry of the model is that only a woman
can have children. This means that a man does not have any decision to make in stage 1.
His complete allocation of time will be devoted to human capital accumulation. For the
remainder of the model, it will mainly be this dierence in human capital accumulation
in stage 1 that will make men distinguishable from women.3
Stage 2:
The `quality' of the children is determined in stage 2. In stage two the woman again
has an allocation of one unit of time. This can be devoted to either working in the labor
market (tF
2 ) or to staying at home looking after the children (1   tF
2 ). If the woman
has no children in stage 1, she will necessarily spend all her time in stage 2 in the labor
market. I will assume that a woman's labor income (yF) is equal to the product of the







Time spend at home improves the quality of the children. However, the extent of the
3An additional potential dierence between men and women will be that we allow for dierences in
male and female return on identical levels of market related human capital (see discussion below).
5quality improvement depends both on the woman's and man's time spent at home. It
is in this sense that children are family public goods in this model.
Before discussing further this issue of child quality, I consider rst the man's al-
location of time in period 2. The situation here is entirely symmetric with that of the
woman. The man devotes time tM
2 to the labor market, and time 1   tM
2 to staying at





The parameter  captures wage dierentials between men and woman. When  > 1,
this implies a man is paid more than s woman with the same level of human capital.
The reverse is true when  < 1. The empirical evidence suggests that  > 1 (see for
example Oaxaca 1973, Gunderson 1989, Card and DiNardo 2002, and Blau and Kahn
2003).
The utility function of each player in this model has two arguments. The rst
argument is income. It should be noted that income here is not pooled. The man
and woman have separate incomes. The second argument is a quality adjusted child









where D is a decreasing function of tF
2 , tM
2 and tF
1 . That is, the quality adjusted child
quantity index is an increasing function of the number of children a woman has at stage
1, and of the time spent at home by both the woman and man looking after the children
in stage 2. The man and woman are assumed to be equally well adapted to looking
after the children and doing household tasks in stage 2. That is, the woman's stage 1
investment in having children does not make her any better equipped than her husband
in educating and caring for them during stage 2. To simplify matters, I will assume
that D has the following functional form:







6An important implication of this functional form is that when both parents spend all
their time working in stage 2, neither derives any utility from their children. To put
it another way, when both parents spend all their time working in stage 2, the quality
adjusted child quantity index is zero in both parents' utility function irrespective of the
total number of children. However, as long as one parent spends some time with the
children during stage 2 both parents reap the rewards and derive positive utility from
their children.
I make three further simplications. First, I assume that human capital accumu-
lation is a linear function of time invested.4 That is,
H(t) = h  t:
Second, I assume that stage 2 income is a linear function of accumulated human capital.
Third, I assume that utility is equal to the sum of income and the quality adjusted child


























From a comparison of (1) and (2) it can be seen that the quality adjusted child quantity
index enters into both parents utility functions, and hence children are family public
goods.
4Assuming constant returns to scale in human capital accumulation as a function of time invested is
a common assumption in the literature. However, Trostel (2004) presents empirical evidence that sug-
gests the existence of signicant increasing returns at low allocations of time and signicant decreasing
returns at high allocations of time to human capital accumulation. But even taking these ndings into
account assuming a linear human capital production function is still a good rst approximation.
73 Becker Type Household Decisions
As a reference case, let us rst assume with Becker (1981) that the joint family utility
function gets maximized. Family behavior is then the result of maximizing a single
household utility function that describes the joint interests of all household members.
The maximization of the Joint Family Utility function is determined by backward
induction. First the optimal stage 2 time allocations (the values of tF
2 and tM
2 ) are
derived as functions of tF
1 . Then the optimal stage 1 investment in children (the value
of tF
1 ) is determined. Joint family utility is given by adding the previously considered
individual utility functions of husband and wife when married. That is, the joint family
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2 do not feature in either of these rst order conditions it follows
that we will only observe corner solutions in stage 2. There are three possible cases:
(i) tF
2 = tM
2 = 0: both husband and wife spend stage 2 looking after children only.
(ii) tF
2 = 0;tM
2 = 1: the wife spends all of her stage 2 time at home with the children
while the husband works full time.
(iii) tF
2 = tM
2 = 1: both spouses spend stage 2 working in the market only.
The case where tF
2 = 1 and tM
2 = 0 cannot be observed when   1, since the fact that
tF
1  1 implies that it is not possible for @(UF +UM)=@tF
2 > 0 and @(UF +UM)=@tM
2 < 0
to hold simultaneously. To determine the optimal solution, the joint utilities of these







It follows that for the case in which both partners nd it optimal to spend stage 2
looking after their children only, the joint family utility function (3) is maximized at
tF
1 = 0. To check that the solutions for stage 2 assumed here are consistent with the
stage 1 solution, I substitute tF




















= h   2G(0):
Given that @(UF + UM)=@tF
2 jtF
1 =0 < 0, it follows that tF
1 = 0 implies that tF
2 = 0.
However, @(UF + UM)=@tM
2 jtF
1 =0 < 0 only holds when h < 2G(0). That is, the man's
wage income is smaller than the maximum possible family gain he could get. Hence







M = h + 2G(t
F
1 )
For cases where the wife spends all of her stage 2 time looking after children while the
husband spends all of his time in the market, UF + UM is again maximized at tF
1 = 0.
It follows from the results obtained for case (i) that this solution is only internally
consistent when h > 2G(0). In this case, UF
m + UM







It follows that when both partners spend all of stage 2 in the market, (3) is maximized
at tF
1 = 1. Substituting tF





















= h > 0:
Hence when tF
1 = 1, it follows that tF
2 = tM
2 = 1. The solution therefore is internally
consistent. In this case, UF
m + UM
m = (1 + )h.
Therefore, in cases (i) and (ii), tF
1 = 0 (the woman specializes in children only),
while in case (iii), tF
1 = 1 (the woman specializes in market activities only). From a
comparison of these three cases, it can be seen that case (i) is optimal when 2G(0) > h,
case (ii) is optimal when h < 2G(0) < h, and case (iii) is optimal when 2G(0) < h.
When 2G(0) > h, the maximum family gain a woman can get exceeds her maximum
possible wage income. Case (ii) is never optimal when  = 1 (except in the special case
where 2G(0) = h, where all three cases generate the same family utility).
No interior solutions are observed in the specication of the model considered
here. It should be noted, however, that interior solutions in the stage 2 choices of the
woman and man may arise in more general specications of the model, such as a utility
function that has interaction terms involving money income and the quality adjusted
child quantity index, or a more 
exible D function.
In this section it is assumed that both spouses behave in a manner consistent with
maximization of the sum of their individual utilities. That is, we assume cooperation
between husband and wife with respect to stage 1 as well as stage 2 behavior. However,
it is important to note that when the cooperative solution is case (ii), where the man
specializes in working and the woman in having and caring for children, the cooperative
solution will not necessarily coincide with the noncooperative solution. In the absence
of a transfer from the man to compensate her for the income she has lost from having
and caring for children, the woman may switch from specializing in children under joint
maximization to specializing in working in the noncooperative case. This is because
the woman's utility level in this case is G(0). If instead, she specializes in accumulating
human capital in stage 1, and working in stage 2, her utility level is h. Assuming  < 2,




2 = 1 than when tF
1 = tF
2 = 0, tM
t = 1, even though the latter maximizes
10family utility.5
The Becker model focuses on maximizing family utility on the grounds that it must
then be possible to compensate all family members in such a way to make this alternative
a Pareto improvement on all other alternatives. However, this ignores the fact that the
woman may have to commit to her human capital level prior to the payment of any
compensation, and that it may not be possible to commit to this payment in advance.
In such a situation, the family may not be able to achieve the family utility maximizing
outcome. I investigate this issue in the next section.
4 Bargaining Approach
In this section it is assumed that each family member tries to maximize his or her own
utility function rather than a joint family utility function. If the family members could
agree before the investment period on how to distribute the gains from their `coopera-
tion' and write a binding contract they could collectively receive the same outcome as
if they maximized a joint household utility function. The situation considered here is
one in which no such binding agreements can be made. In the industrial organization
literature such a situation is referred to as the \hold-up" problem (see Tirole 1988 and
Hart 1995).6 In addition, I assume in stage 2 the family can either remain married or
get divorced. If married, gains from marriage are split via a bargaining process. If the
partners get divorced each realizes his/her outside options.
4.1 The Possibility of Divorce
It is assumed here that no-fault divorce can occur in period 2. That is, the divorce
can be initiated by either spouse without consent of his or her partner. Zelder (1993)
5It is always optimal for the man to choose tM
2 = 1 when tF
1 = 1, since there are then no children
and hence no reason to stay at home in stage 2.
6The two most common reasons for the existence of the hold-up problem are transaction costs in
writing a complete contract and the impossibility of specifying all possible future states that a complete
contract would have to cover.
11investigates the eect of the public good, children, on the occurrence and eciency of
divorce when the legal regime switches from fault to no-fault divorce.7 He concludes
that more inecient divorces will occur under a no fault divorce regime because of the
non-transferability of the family public good children. He does not, however, investigate
how dierent divorce regulations in
uence the provision of the public good `children'.
This is exactly the point I want to address.
I borrow from Zelder (1993) the concept of a visitation rate, that regulates the
division of the public good between the parents in case of a divorce. Let the husband's
visitation rate be v and the wife's visitation rate (1-v), with v lying in the interval
[0,1]. If the family remains married during stage 2 both have unlimited `access' to their
children so the eective visitation rate is 1 for both of them. If divorce occurs, children
cannot be enjoyed by both parents simultaneously and therefore children cease to be
family public goods.
The dierent custody rules in case of a divorce can be expressed in terms of the
visitation rule:
1) v = 0: the woman gets sole custody over the children in case of divorce.
2) v = 1: the man gets sole custody over the children in case of divorce.
3) v = 1=2: joint custody.
The impact of a divorce therefore is to set an upper bound on the amount of time
each parent can spend with the children. The bounds are as follows:
t
F
2  v; t
M
2  1   v:
That is, when divorced, the man can spend a maximum proportion v of his time allo-
cation in stage 2 with the children, while the woman can spend a maximum of 1  v of
her time in stage 2 with the children.
Divorce changes the utility maximization problem of the woman and the man. If
divorce occurs, children cease to be a family public good and gains from marriage will
7In this setting divorce is ecient if total joint utility in the married state is no larger than the sum
of individual utilities in the divorced state.
12be zero. That is, the children respond positively to the time their parents spend with
them, which in turn increases the utility the parents derive from the children. Both
parents therefore benet from the time either parent spends with the children if they
all live in the same household. If, by contrast, the parents have divorced, the positive
eect on the children is not shared by the absent parent.
4.2 The Dynamics of the Bargaining Game
I consider a bargaining game with two parts. The rst corresponds to stage 1 discussed
above. That is, the woman decides on how to allocate her stage 1 time between accu-
mulating human capital and having children and chooses tF
1 . In the second part, the
woman and man must decide whether to stay married or to divorce. They stay married
if they are able to agree on how to split the marriage surplus. If they are unable to
reach agreement they divorce. They also choose how to allocate their period two time
between work and children by choosing tF
2 and tM
2 , respectively. In the case of divorce,
these choices are constrained by the visitation rule.
4.2.1 Nash Bargaining
I assume that the division of the marriage surplus is determined by Nash (1950) bar-
gaining. That is, during stage 2 the couple will decide on how to split the marriage
surplus in a cooperative way. Nash bargaining maximizes the product gain from co-
operation. It leads to a situation where each partner receives his/her divorce utility
(which corresponds with his/her threat-point) plus half of the marriage gains. The
model is again solved by backward induction. That is, both husband and wife rst cal-
culate their optimal stage 2 behavior and corresponding pay-os for all possible stage
2 starting positions. Then, given this information, they calculate their optimal stage 1
behavior. Note again, that I assume that no binding contract can be written specifying
either party's stage 1 or stage 2 behavior in advance. That is, neither the woman's
optimal stage 1 investment in children nor an optimal stage 2 transfer payment can be
13made part of a binding contract.
Stage 2
The total marriage gain is given by the dierence between the sum of their married













m denote the utility of the woman and man when they are married,
and UF
d and UM
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where ^ t2 denotes a stage two married time allocation, and ~ t2 a stage 2 divorced time
allocation.
Given this information about the marriage surplus and how it will be divided in
stage 2 if they remain married, the woman now faces the following utility maximization
problem: Her utility function V F is given by the sum of her divorce utility plus her
share of the marriage gains. It is assumed that the marriage gains are split via Nash
bargaining. Given that tF
1 is already xed by the beginning of the bargaining process,
then, assuming the woman and man have equal bargaining abilities, it follows that
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In stage 2 she will maximize this utility function with respect to ~ tF
2 as well as ^ tF
2 to nd
her optimal behavior when divorced as well as married. This yields the following stage























Similarly, the man's overall utility function is now as follows:
V
M = h~ t
M



















(2   ^ t
F











Maximizing this utility function with respect to ~ tM
2 as well as ^ tM
2 yields the following





















Given that ~ tF
2 , ^ tF
2 , ~ tM
2 and ^ tM
2 do not feature in any of these rst order conditions,
it follows again that we will only observe corner solutions in stage 2. Both parties'
optimal period two behavior is determined by the values of h and  as well as tF
1 .
In stage 2 the spouses must decide whether to stay married or get divorced. The
fact that the gains from marriage are always positive when children are present means
that rational individuals will never divorce in stage 2 if there was investment in children
during state 1 (tF
1 < 1). If no children are present, divorce may occur during stage 2.
As marriage gains are equal to zero in that case anyway, there is no dierence between
the woman's and man's married and divorce payos.
Stage 1
During stage 2 it is assumed that the couple behaves in a cooperative way and
splits gains from marriage according to the Nash bargaining rule. However, investment
15choices in stage 1 are made non-cooperatively. That is, rather than maximizing the joint
family utility function, each family member chooses their behavior so as to maximize
their own private utility function. Considering rst the stage 2 rst order conditions
for the woman, it can be seen that there are three possible cases.
(i-F) htF
1 =2 < htF
1 < G(tF
1 ) ) ~ tF
2 = v;^ tF
2 = 0
She spends as much time as possible with children in stage 2
(ii-F) htF
1 =2 < G(tF
1 ) < htF
1 ) ~ tF
2 = 1;^ tF
2 = 0
She stays with children when married but works full time when divorced in stage 2.
(iii-F) G(tF
1 ) < htF
1 =2 < htF
1 ) ~ tF
2 = 1;^ tF
2 = 1
She works all the time during stage 2 whether or not she is married.
Similarly for the man, there are also three possible cases for stage 2:
(i-M) h=2 < h < G(tF
1 ) ) ~ tM
2 = 1   v;^ tM
2 = 0
He spends as much time as possible with children in stage 2.
(ii-M) h=2 < G(tF
1 ) < h ) ~ tM
2 = 1;^ tM
2 = 0
He stays with children when married but works full time when divorced in stage 2.
(iii-M) G(tF
1 ) < h=2 < h ) ~ tM
2 = 1;^ tM
2 = 1
He works all the time during stage 2 whether or not he is married.
Using the fact that tF
1  1 as well as   1, the female and male cases can be
linked as follows:
(i-F) is consistent with any of (i-M), (ii-M) and (iii-M),
(ii-F) is consistent with (ii-M) and (iii-M),
(iii-F) is consistent only with (iii-M),
(i-M) is consistent only with (i-F),
(ii-M) is consistent with (i-F) and (ii-F),
(iii-M) is consistent with any of (i-F), (ii-F) and (iii-F).
In total, therefore, there are six cases that must be considered. I will solve for the
optimal value of tF
1 , denoted here by  tF
1 , for each in turn. This is done for each of the
3 possible divorce visitation rules (i.e. v = 0, v = 0:5, and v = 1).
164.3 Discussion of the Six Possible Cases


































































It was assumed earlier that G(tF
1 ) had the following properties: G(1) = 0, G0(tF
1 ) <
0 and G00(tF
1 ) < 0. As 0 < h=8 < h=3, we know that in this case the woman's optimal
investment in children during stage 1 decreases with increases in the husband's stage 2
visitation rights in case of divorce. For this solution to be internally consistent, it must
be the case that @V F=@~ tF
2 , @V F=@^ tF
2 , @V M=@~ tM
2 and @V M=@^ tM
2 are all negative when
evaluated at  tF
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< 0 ) h < 2G( t
F
1 ):
If the third condition is satised, all the others must be as well.
Case 2 ((i-F) and (ii-M)): Both spend all their stage 2 time with children when



































































As 0 < h=9 < h=4, the woman's optimal stage 1 investment in children is again
decreasing as the husband's visitation right in case of divorce (v) increases.
For this solution to be internally consistent, it must be the case that @V F=@~ tF
2 ,
@V F=@^ tF
2 , and @V M=@^ tM
2 are all negative while @V M=@~ tM
2 is positive, when evaluated
at  tF
1 . These inequality conditions again yield four constraints. The only dierence with
case (i) is that now the direction of the inequality sign in the third condition is reversed.
It is now necessary to check the third condition and whichever is most binding out of
the rst and fourth conditions.






























































As 0 < h=5 < h=2, the woman's optimal stage 1 investment in children is again
decreasing as the husband's visitation right in case of divorce (v) increases.
For this solution to be internally consistent, it must be the case that @V F=@~ tF
2 and
@V F=@^ tF
2 are negative, and @V M=@^ tM
2 and @V M=@~ tM
2 are positive, when evaluated at
 tF
1 . Now it is the rst and third conditions that are most binding.
Case 4 ((ii-F) and (ii-M)): Both spend all time with children when married

























1 ) =  
h
4
For this solution to be internally consistent, it must be the case that @V F=@~ tF
2 and
@V F=@~ tM
2 are positive, and @V M=@^ tF
2 and @V M=@^ tM
2 are negative, when evaluated at
 tF
1 .
Case 5 ((ii-F) and (iii-M)): Wife spends all time with children when married






















1 ) =  
h
2
For this solution to be internally consistent, it must be the case that @V F=@^ tF
2 is
negative, and @V M=@~ tF
2 , @V F=@~ tM
2 , and @V M=@^ tM
2 are positive, when evaluated at  tF
1 .










For this solution to be internally consistent, it must be the case that @V F=@~ tF
2 ,
@V M=@^ tF
2 , @V F=@~ tM
2 , and @V M=@^ tM
2 are all positive, when evaluated at  tF
1 . If the
second condition is satised, all the others must be as well.
For cases 4 and 5, the woman's optimal stage 1 investment in children does not
depend on the husband's visitation right in the event of divorce. This is because, in
these cases, the woman does not spend any time with her children in stage 2 in the
event of divorce and hence the visitation rules are non binding. In case 6, there are no
children.
The rst ve cases can generate interior solutions for tF
1 (the woman's time spent
accumulating market related human capital during stage 1). Thus there may be positive
investments in children in these cases. For the sixth case tF
1 = 1 and there will be no
19investment in children in stage 1. Given that by assumption G00(tF
1 ) < 0, we know
that the interior solution must be a maximum. A sucient condition to ensure that
the interior solutions for tF
1 , when v > 0, all lie in the range (0,1) is that G0(1) = 0,
jG0(0)j > h=2 and h < 2. For v = 0:5 or 1, the bound on G0(0) can be tightened to
jG0(0)j < h=9. Given these constraints on G0(0) and G0(1), the following ranking of
solutions for tF
1 is obtained:
A low value of  tF
1 implies a high fertility rate. I rank these cases (and subcases)
according to the optimal number of children that will be born in each of them:
 fertility will be greatest and equal to the maximum possible number of children
in the following cases: case 1 (when v = 0), case 2 (when v = 0) and case 3 (when
v = 0)
 the second largest fertility level will be obtained in case 2 when v = 0:5
 the third largest fertility level will be obtained in case 1 when v = 0:5
 the fourth largest fertility level will be obtained in case 3 when v = 0:5
 the fth largest fertility level will be obtained in case 2 when v = 1 or case 4
(independent of v)
 the sixth largest fertility level will be obtained in case 1 when v = 1
 the seventh largest fertility level will be obtained in case 3 when v = 1 or case 5
(independent of v)
 the lowest fertility level (with fertility equal to zero) will be obtained in case 6
(independent of v)
If there are no children, as is the situation in case 6, whether the couple remain
married or divorce is irrelevant in this model.
The case actually observed is the one that maximizes the woman's utility V F. In
general, this will depend both on the parameters h; and v, and the functional form
20of G(tF
1 ). Here I consider a few examples and contrast the results obtained in the
bargaining model with those obtained under joint family maximization.
4.4 Illustrative Examples
In the following examples, I set v = 0 and  = 1:4. That is, I assume that, in the event
of divorce, the woman gets custody of the children and that men get a 40 percent wage
premium over women.8 In addition, G(tF
1 ) is assumed to have the following functional
form: G(tF
1 ) = 5(1   tF
1 )1=2. This means that the maximum number of children a
woman can have is 5. I now consider how varying h (the rate at which human capital is
accumulated) in the range from 5 to 12 aects the outcome. The solutions for UF +UM
for each of the three joint utility maximization cases, as functions of h, are as follows:
Case (i): UF + UM = 20
Case (ii): UF + UM = 1:4h + 10
Case (iii): UF + UM = 2:4h
The solutions for V F for each of the six bargaining cases, as functions of h, are as
follows:
Case 1: V F = 12:5   0:7h
Case 2: V F = 12:5   0:7h
Case 3: V F = 7:5
Case 4: V F = 10   0:7h for h < 10
V F = 50=h   h=5 for h  10
Case 5: V F = 5 for h < 5
V F = h=2   25=(2h) + 5 for h  5
Case 6: V F = h
 Example 1: h = 5
Joint maximization:
8For a discussion of how changes in  in
uence the results see section 5.
21Case (i): UF + UM = 20
Case (ii): UF + UM = 17
Case (iii): UF + UM = 12





Case 1:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 9
Case 2:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 9
Case 3:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 7:5
Case 4:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 6:5
Case 5:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 5
Case 6:  tF
1 = 1; V F = 5




 Example 2: h = 8
Joint maximization:
Case (i): UF + UM = 20
Case (ii): UF + UM = 21:2
Case (iii): UF + UM = 19:2
Hence case (ii) is observed: tF
1 = tF
2 = 0 and tM
2 = 1.
Bargaining
Case 1:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 6:9
Case 2:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 6:9
Case 3:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 7:5
Case 4:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 4:4
Case 5:  tF
1 = 0:61; V F = 7:44
Case 6:  tF
1 = 1; V F = 8




 Example 3: h = 10
9Divorce is never observed as an equilibrium outcome and hence there is no need here to distinguish
here between 1 and 2. Both cases generate the same ^ tF
2 and ^ tM
2 .
22Joint maximization:
Case (i): UF + UM = 20
Case (ii): UF + UM = 24
Case (iii): UF + UM = 24









Case 1:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 5:5
Case 2:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 5:5
Case 3:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 7:5
Case 4:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 3
Case 5:  tF
1 = 0:75; V F = 8:75
Case 6:  tF
1 = 1; V F = 10




 Example 4: h = 12
Joint maximization:
Case (i): UF + UM = 20
Case (ii): UF + UM = 26:8
Case (iii): UF + UM = 28:8





Case 1:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 4:1
Case 2:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 4:1
Case 3:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 7:5
Case 4:  tF
1 = 0:31; V F = 2:97
Case 5:  tF
1 = 0:83; V F = 9:96
Case 6:  tF
1 = 1; V F = 12




A comparison of these results reveals that the level of fertility falls both in the
23joint utility maximization and bargaining models as h rises. This result follows from
the fact that working in the labor market becomes more and more attractive relative
to having children as h rises. Furthermore, the woman tends to choose a lower level of
fertility in stage 1 in the bargaining model than would be consistent with joint utility
maximization. This can be seen in the examples where h = 8 and 10. The woman does
this to protect her bargaining position in stage 2.
5 Some Implications for Fertility Levels
Until the 1960s, child custody was almost always assigned to the mother. Rising claims
of sex discrimination in custody decisions by fathers, the rise of the feminist movement,
and the entry of large numbers of women into the workforce weakened the concept of a
primary maternal caretaker (see Kelly 1994, and Cancian and Meyer 1998). As a result,
male visitation rates have since increased signicantly.
5.0.1 The Impact of v
The impact on fertility of a rise in the male visitation right, v, can be explored in the
context of the model. I do not explore the possibility of interdependence between female
labor participation and child custody rules. Rather, I assume that visitation rates are
set exogenously. An increase in v from 0 to 0.5 reduces fertility for cases 1-3, but has
no impact in cases 4-5 since the woman spends all her time working in the event of
divorce as discussed above. In case 6 there are no children. Assuming that the fertility
function G(tF
1 ) diers across women, we would expect to observe all six cases across
the whole population. Overall, therefore, we would expect a rise in v to reduce fertility.
The possibility of such a causal relationship has received little if any attention in the
literature.
245.0.2 The Impact of 
Changes in the male-female wage dierential as captured here by the parameter  may
also impact on fertility. Card and DiNardo (2002) nd that male-female wage dierential
in the US fell signicantly between 1967 and 1994 and then remained approximately
stable between 1994 and 2000. Hence although  remains greater than 1, its value has
fallen in recent decades. Changes in  do not aect fertility levels in any of the six cases
of section 5. However, changes in  can switch the outcome from one case to another.
More precisely, a fall in  acts to reduce the likelihood that case (iii-M) is observed
and increase the likelihood that case (i-M) is observed. This reduces the likelihood that
cases 3, 5 and 6 are observed, and increases the likelihood of observing case 1. Overall,
therefore, a reduction in  should raise fertility since it reduces the relative bargaining
power of the man.
5.0.3 The Impact of h
Changes in wage rates can also impact on fertility. Here I will equate a rise in wages
with an increased value of the parameter h. Strictly speaking, h here measures the
rate at which human capital accumulates rather than the wage rate. However, given
that the human capital accumulation function is assumed to be linear, a rise in h is
equivalent to a rise in the wage rate in the model. The empirical evidence on trends
in wage rates in the US in recent decades is mixed. Sullivan (1997) discusses how real
hourly earnings rose from 1964 to 1972, but then fell from 1972 to 1996. By contrast,
real hourly compensation rose throughout this whole period. Sullivan (1997) argues
that the dierence is due to measurement problems with the real hourly earnings series.
Focusing on real hourly compensation, it follows that h has risen in recent decades. A
rise in h acts to reduce fertility in cases 1-5, except when v = 0 in cases 1-3. In case 6,
fertility is already zero to begin with. A rise in h also reduces the likelihood that cases
(i-F) and (i-M) are observed (parents staying at home with the children in stage 2) and
increases the likelihood of observing cases (iii-F) and (iii-M) (parents working in the
25market in period 2), thus further acting to reduce fertility. This nding is as expected,
since a rise in the wage rate increases the attractiveness of working as compared with
having children.
Overall, the cumulative impact of recent changes in v,  and h in the US are
broadly consistent with a decline in fertility. The fertility rate did decline until the
early 1970s, since when it has been more or less stable (see d'Addio and d'Ercole 2005).
One possible way of reconciling this nding with the predictions of the model is that
starting in the 1970s, real wages rose faster for workers on higher incomes. The wages
of lower income workers { who also tend to have higher fertility rates { have stagnated.
Hence for this group h has not risen.
6 Extension: The Case of Child Subsidies
Suppose now that the government pays a subsidy a in stage 2 to the parents of each
child born. This payment is nanced through a proportional tax rate s on income in
stage 2. I will treat both a and s as exogenous, and hence I do not impose a balanced
budget on the government. When the parents are married, I assume that the child
subsidy is paid to the woman. In the event of divorce, the child subsidy is split in
accordance with the visitation rights. That is, the man receives av and the woman
a(1   v).
6.1 Introducing Child Subsidy a in Becker-type Model
Considering rst the cooperative Becker type scenario, the utility of a married woman
can be written as follows:
U
F











Similarly, a married man's utility function is as follows:
U
M
m = (1   s)ht
M







26The joint family utility function therefore is given by
U
F + U


























= (1   s)h   2G(t
F
1 ): (5)
Again, given that tF
2 and tM
2 do not feature in either of these rst order conditions
it follows that we will only observe corner solutions in stage 2. The three possible cases
are the same as before:
(i) tF
2 = tM
2 = 0: both husband and wife spend stage 2 looking after children only.
(ii) tF
2 = 0;tM
2 = 1: the wife spends all of her stage 2 time at home with the children
while the husband works full time.
(iii) tF
2 = tM




M = (4 + a)G(t
F
1 )
It follows that UF + UM is maximized at tF
1 = 0. The consistency of this solution can
be checked by substituting tF




















= (1   s)h   2G(0):
Given that @(UF + UM)=@tF
2 jtF
1 =0 < 0, it follows that tF
1 = 0 implies that tF
2 = 0.
Given that @(UF +UM)=@tM
2 jtF
1 =0 < 0 only holds when (1 s)h < 2G(0), the internal
consistency of this solution requires that this inequality is satised. In this case, UF
m +
UM
m = (4 + a)G(0).
27Compared with the no-subsidy situation in section 4, total family utility has in-





M = (1   s)h + (2 + a)G(t
F
1 )
It follows that UF+UM is again maximized at tF
1 = 0. From the results obtained for case
(i), it can be seen that this solution is only internally consistent when (1 s)h > 2G(0).
In this case, UF
m + UM
m = (1   s)h + (2 + a)G(0).
Compared with section 4, total family utility is decreased by sh, but increased
by aG(0). Whether total family wellbeing is improved by the child subsidy scheme




M = (1   s)ht
F
1 + (1   s)h + aG(t
F
1 )
The stage 2 rst order conditions are given by (4) and (5). Dierentiating with respect
to tF








A sucient condition for this case to generate an interior solution for tF
1 , denoted here
by  tF







For this solution to be compatible with tF
2 = tM























These conditions translate to the following:
(1   s)h t
F
1 > 2G( t
F
1 );
(1   s)h > 2G( t
F
1 ):
28As   1 and  tF
1 < 1, the rst of these inequalities is more binding. It follows therefore
that for this solution to be valid, it must be the case that  tF
1 >  tF
1 where (1   s)h tF
1 =
2G( tF
1 ). In this case, we obtain that UF
m + UM
m = (1   s)h tF
1 + (1   s)h + aG( tF
1 ). In
section 4, case (iii) always implied a corner solution in both stages 1 and 2. This is no
longer the case here when condition (6) is satised. If instead (1   s)h > ajG0(1)j, the
same corner solution with  tF
1 = 1 will be observed as in section 4. In this case, total
family utility is given by UF +UM = (1 s)(1+)h. This indicates that a family that
has no children will be strictly worse o as a result of the child subsidy scheme as they
will have to pay a child subsidy tax without receiving the child subsidy.
From a comparison of the three cases, it can be seen that case (i) is optimal
when 2G(0) > (1   s)h. When 2G(0) < (1   s)h, determining which out of cases
(ii) and (iii) is more problematic. A sucient condition for (ii) to be optimal is that
(1   s)h < 2G(0) < (1   s)h. A sucient condition for (iii) to be optimal is that
(2+a)G(0) < (1 s)h. Without specifying a functional form for G(tF
1 ) it is dicult to
say more than this. In comparison with section 4, the introduction of the child subsidy
scheme increases the likelihood that the case in which both parents spend stage 2 with
their children { that is case (i) { is optimal.
6.2 Introducing a Child Subsidy a into the Bargaining Model
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ht
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1 ) + va;
subject to t
M
2  1   v:























where ^ t2 again denotes a stage two married time allocation, and ~ t2 a stage 2 divorced
time allocation.
Assuming again that the marriage surplus is split via Nash bargaining, the woman's
overall utility function becomes:
V

















(1   s)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(2   ^ t
F
2   ^ t
M
2 ) + (1   v)a +
(~ tM







Dierentiating V F with respect to ~ tF
2 and ^ tF
























Similarly, the man's overall utility function is now as follows:
V
M = (1   s)h~ t
M




1 ) + U
F+M=2
=
(1   s)h(~ tM
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2 ) + va +
(~ tF







Maximizing this utility function with respect to ~ tM
2 as well as ^ tM
2 yields the following





















Given that ~ tF
2 , ^ tF
2 , ~ tM
2 and ^ tM
2 again do not feature in any of these rst order con-
ditions, it follows that we will only observe corner solutions in stage 2. Both parties'
optimal period two behavior is determined by the values of s, h and  and tF
1 . Con-
sidering rst the stage 2 rst order conditions for the woman, there are three possible
30cases.
(i-F) (1   s)htF
1 =2 < (1   s)htF
1 < G(tF
1 ) ) ~ tF
2 = v;^ tF
2 = 0
She spends as much time as possible with children in stage 2. Any positive tax rate s
will increase the likelihood that case (i-F) applies.
(ii-F) (1   s)htF
1 =2 < G(tF
1 ) < (1   s)htF
1 ) ~ tF
2 = 1;^ tF
2 = 0
She stays with children when married but works full time when divorced in stage 2.
(iii-F) G(tF
1 ) < (1   s)htF
1 =2 < (1   s)htF
1 ) ~ tF
2 = 1;^ tF
2 = 1
She works all the time during stage 2 whether or not she is married. Any positive tax
rate s will reduce the likelihood that case (iii-F) applies.
Similarly for the man, the three cases for stage 2 are:
(i-M) (1   s)h=2 < (1   s)h < G(tF
1 ) ) ~ tM
2 = 1   v;^ tM
2 = 0
He spends as much time as possible with children in stage 2.
(ii-M) (1   s)h=2 < G(tF
1 ) < (1   s)h ) ~ tM
2 = 1;^ tM
2 = 0
He stays with children when married but works full time when divorced in stage 2.
(iii-M) G(tF
1 ) < (1   s)h=2 < (1   s)h ) ~ tM
2 = 1;^ tM
2 = 1
He works all the time during stage 2 whether or not he is married. Again, a positive tax
rate s increases the likelihood of case (i-M) and decreases the likelihood of case (iii-M)
applying.
This again leads to the same six cases as in section 5.
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For this solution to be internally consistent, it must be the case that @V F=@~ tF
2 ,
@V F=@^ tF
2 , @V M=@~ tM
2 and @V M=@^ tM
2 are all negative when evaluated at  tF
1 . These




< 0 ) (1   s)h t
F






< 0 ) (1   s)h t
F












< 0 ) (1   s)h < 2G( t
F
1 ):
The righthand side of these inequality constraints is the same as in section 5. The
lefthand side has been multiplied by (1   s) for each inequality. Since by assumption
s > 0 for any positive child subsidy a, this will make it more likely that all constraints
hold in case 1.
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For this solution to be internally consistent, it must be the case that @V F=@~ tF
2 ,
@V F=@^ tF
2 , and @V M=@^ tM
2 are all negative while @V M=@~ tM
2 is positive, when evaluated
at  tF
1 .
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For this solution to be internally consistent, it must be the case that @V F=@~ tF
2 and
@V F=@^ tF
2 are negative, and @V M=@^ tM
2 and @V M=@~ tM
2 are positive, when evaluated at
 tF
1 .
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For this solution to be internally consistent, it must be the case that @V F=@~ tF
2 and
@V F=@~ tM
2 are positive, and @V M=@^ tF
2 and @V M=@^ tM
2 are negative, when evaluated at
 tF
1 .
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For this solution to be internally consistent, it must be the case that @V F=@^ tF
2 is
negative, and @V M=@~ tF
2 , @V F=@~ tM
2 , and @V M=@^ tM
2 are positive, when evaluated at  tF
1 .
Case 6 ((iii-F) and (iii-M)):
V
F = (1   s)ht
F




































A corner solution is obtained when v = 1. In this case, @V F=@tF
1 = (1   s)h > 0. In
section 5, case 6 always generates a corner solution in stage 1, irrespective of the value
of v. This is no longer the case here, except when v = 1. Only in this case does the
woman get no benet from having children if she divorces.
For this solution to be internally consistent, it must be the case that @V F=@~ tF
2 ,
@V M=@^ tF
2 , @V F=@~ tM
2 , and @V M=@^ tM
2 are all positive, when evaluated at  tF
1 . If the
second condition is satised, all the others must be as well. With a positive s, these
conditions are less likely to be satised than before.
6.3 The Impact of Child Subsidy a - An Illustration
In the following examples, I illustrate the impact of the child subsidy for a particular
parameterization of the model. I again set v = 0,  = 1:4 and G(tF
1 ) = 5(1   tF
1 )1=2.
In addition, I assume that the government budget with regard to the child subsidy is
balanced for a family where tF
1 = 0:5 and tF
2 = tM
2 = 1. This restriction yields the







Setting a = 1, it therefore follows that s = 0:658=h.
The solutions for UF + UM are as follows:
Case (i): UF + UM = 25
Case (ii): UF + UM = 1:4(h   0:658) + 15
Case (iii): UF + UM = 2:4(h   0:658) + 5
The solutions for V F for each of the six bargaining cases, as functions of h, are as
follows:
Case 1: V F = 17:5   0:7(h   0:658)
Case 2: V F = 17:5   0:7(h   0:658)
34Case 3: V F = 12:5
Case 4: V F = 15   0:7(h   0:658) for h < 15:658,10
Case 5: V F = 10 for h < 10:658
V F = 10 + [(h   0:658)=2][1   100=(h   0:658)2] for h  10:658
Case 6: V F = h + 4:342 for h < 3:158
V F = 5 + (h   0:658)[1   6:25=(h   0:658)2] for h  3:158
 Example 1: h = 5
Joint maximization:
Case (i): UF + UM = 25
Case (ii): UF + UM = 21:08
Case (iii): UF + UM = 15:42





Case 1:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 14:46
Case 2:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 14:46
Case 3:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 12:5
Case 4:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 11:96
Case 5:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 10
Case 6:  tF
1 = 0:67; V F = 7:90




 Example 2: h = 8
Joint maximization:
Case (i): UF + UM = 25
Case (ii): UF + UM = 25:28
Case (iii): UF + UM = 22:62
Hence case (ii) is observed: tF
1 = tF
2 = 0 and tM
2 = 1.
10This inequality constraint is obtained by setting G0( tF
1 )jv=0 = (1   s)h=(4 + 2a), and then nding
what restriction must be imposed on h to ensure that  tF
1 > 0.
35Bargaining
Case 1:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 12:36
Case 2:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 12:36
Case 3:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 12:5
Case 4:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 9:86
Case 5:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 10
Case 6:  tF
1 = 0:88; V F = 11:49
Hence case 3 is observed: tF
1 = tF
2 = 0 and tM
2 = 1.
 Example 3: h = 10
Joint maximization:
Case (i): UF + UM = 25
Case (ii): UF + UM = 28:08
Case (iii): UF + UM = 27:42
Hence case (ii) is observed: tF
1 = tF
2 = 0 and tM
2 = 1.
Bargaining
Case 1:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 10:96
Case 2:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 10:96
Case 3:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 12:5
Case 4:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 8:46
Case 5:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 10
Case 6:  tF
1 = 0:93; V F = 13:67
Hence case 6 is observed: tF
1 = 0:93, and tF
2 = tM
2 = 1.
 Example 4: h = 12
Joint maximization:
Case (i): UF + UM = 25
Case (ii): UF + UM = 30:88
Case (iii): UF + UM = 32:22





36Case 1:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 9:56
Case 2:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 9:56
Case 3:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 12:5
Case 4:  tF
1 = 0; V F = 7:06
Case 5:  tF
1 = 0:22; V F = 11:26
Case 6:  tF
1 = 0:95; V F = 15:79
Hence case 6 is observed: tF
1 = 0:95 and tF
2 = tM
2 = 1.
A comparison of these results with those obtained in section 4 reveals that the
child subsidy does indeed increase the fertility rate. This is particularly true for the
bargaining model where, in the absence of the child subsidy fertility is zero (tF
1 = 1)
when h = 8, 10 or 12, while in the presence of the child subsidy fertility is positive for
all three values (tF
1 < 1).
7 Conclusion
Perhaps the main insight to emerge from this study is how the fundamental asymmetry
between women and men, in terms of child bearing costs, can cause women to overinvest
{ from the perspective of joint utility maximization { in human capital accumulation,
and hence underinvest in children. Women do this to protect their intra-family bargain-
ing position. This phenomenon, by construction, is completely missed by joint utility
maximization models. By combining a bargaining model with the assumption of an
incomplete contracts framework one perhaps gets closer to understanding how families
reach their actual fertility decisions. Bargaining models, such as the one developed here,
therefore are a useful additional tool for understanding fertility patterns and how they
respond to exogenous shocks. In particular, they can shed light on the likely impact on
fertility rates of government initiatives such as child subsidies, as well as changes in the
male-female wage dierential, wages rates and custody rules.
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